nuclear. Could the mentioned new defects further delay the Flamenville EPR?

On March 27, 2024, EDF announced that Flamanville is an EPR “Technically ready to start its commissioning”. And he clarified that his “Connection to National Electricity Grid” Now planned “In the summer of 2024”. Summer, in the administrative sense, extends from June 20 to September 22, leaving a span of three months.

If this were the case, the Flamenville EPR would therefore start at least twelve years late. Actually, at the beginning of the construction work, in December 2007, we aimed to start in June 2012.

The promise of a launch this summer, as it was formulated on March 27, therefore confirms the new delay. In fact, last December, EDF was still banking on a mid-2024 connection. The new minister responsible for energy, Roland Lescure, puts things into perspective, estimating that given the twelve-year delay, “We’re only two weeks away.”

The ASN decision is expected on April 20

This delay results in a new milestone in the process. On March 27, the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) launched a legal public consultation process on its draft opinion on the commissioning of what has become the cursed EDF reactor.

The public can therefore, until April 17, consult reports and documents that recall the history of the project, its various technical risks and findings that allow ASN to consider a positive opinion. The ASN will then have three days to summarize the comments, publish them and publish its decision.

Only then, from April 20 at the latest, will EDF be able to load the radioactive fuel into the reactor vessel and then begin the complex process of putting it into service. As one observer points out, EDF will carry out tests until the summer before connecting the reactor to the grid. So we are not immune to new surprises during this testing phase.

What about newly discovered flaws and falsities?

However, several interferences occurred along the consultation process. They are not mentioned in the ASN draft opinion but there is nothing to suggest that they will not further hamper the commissioning process.

On the one hand, the technical documentation provided by EDF to the operating teams contained deficiencies noted in June 2023, as well as numerous “erasures” made manually on plans specifying certain welds.

In recent weeks, revelations of new cases of fraud on equipment installed at the EPR have been even more disturbing. The topic is experiencing a certain excitement, but neither ASN, nor EDF, nor the justice system, nor the government provide specific elements, both referring to the secrecy of the investigation.

Uncertain cases

The first mention of the new cases of fraud, eight years after the massive scandal of the Areva-Frametome files, was spectacularly done by the ASN on January 30 during its greetings. Unspecified cases of fraud involving sensitive equipment have prompted ASN’s president, Bernard Dorozczuk, to launch a legal investigation.

After the lack of vigilance already noted against the Italian supplier in 2023, then some music was set according to which EDF will still not succeed in properly fulfilling its obligations to control its subcontractors.

On 26 February, EDF’s CEO, Luc Raymont himself, was interviewed by ASN on the subject. Then, after EDF transmitted its “detailed action plan” to combat fraud and poor workmanship on March 19, as requested, ASN returned to the charge on March 26.

Harsh letter from ASN to EDF

In a letter addressed to EDF, with an unusually serious tone, the nuclear policeman asked to deal with it, “severely” cases of “Counterfeit, Forgery and Fraud in Factories Manufacturing Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants” Who would have been “Already identified and what may be discovered in the future.”

For the first time, ASN has clarified that “Recently, irregularities were highlighted in two companies (…) that produce equipment intended for the operation of nuclear reactors as well as the Flamanville EPR reactor.”

These cases differ “by the significant scope of potentially relevant equipment, as well as by the potentially significant consequences on safety” EDF reactor.

ASN also noted “The surveillance carried out by EDF did not make it possible to detect all the irregularities committed by these two suppliers”. An issue has been reported “by a third party” And not detected by EDF, the second was only “As part of preparation for ASN inspection”.

The question now arises as to whether defects or faults in sensitive parts, which may be more numerous, will slow down the new schedule. The revelations come when one might have expected EDF’s vigilance to be no longer absent after the 2016 scandal.

Scandal of hidden defects in the reactor vessel

As indicated in the ASN investigation file, the first anomaly related to the reactor vessel cover was discovered in 2014, without recalling the circumstances. A large curved piece of metal, which has to withstand a pressure of 155 bar and a temperature of 300°. It is very complex because it is crossed by hundreds of elements that make up a nuclear fuel assembly.

In 2014, flaws were discovered in the quality of the steel that made up this cover, as well as an equivalent part made in the bottom of the reactor vessel. It is these discrepancies that were at the root of the revelation, in 2016, of the “crossed files” scandal of Areva (whose relevant factories have since been taken over by Frametom): at least 430 parts, of which 283 are intended for nuclear. Equipment, which contained defects that were hidden from their recipients.

If it is no longer considered necessary to replace the bottom of the vessel, the cover must be carried out, and from the first shutdown of this reactor, about 18 months after its commissioning, and not after ten years of operation. case. asked EDF.

Lid, valve, tank…

The ASN file also recalls that without setting dates, other anomalies will have to be corrected: protection valves on the secondary circuit and replacement of exchangers on the cooling circuit.

Another issue, which seems technically more complicated: to change the geometry of the reactor vessel. Indeed, as was observed at the Taishan EPR (China), its design flaw caused turbulence that damaged the fuel assembly, causing rupture of the fuel cladding and hence radioactive leaks in the primary circuit. The current response from EDF and its supplier Orano is to strengthen these assemblies to make them more resistant.

Many elements that have already resulted in an explosion in the price of EPR have not yet been precisely determined. If its construction cost is now estimated to be 13 billion (i.e. four times the initial amount), this amount does not include the financial cost (borrowing) which has continued to rise in cost while the Court of Auditors estimated it at 6.7 at the time. was billion. The EPR was scheduled to enter service in mid-2023.